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Abstract  8 
The continuity of farming in traditional sloping and mountainous olive production systems 9 
(SMOPS) is at risk, especially in marginally productive areas. The abandonment of olive 10 
production on sloping lands would have adverse economic, social, environmental and cultural 11 
effects. To tackle this risk of abandonment and to improve the sustainability of traditional 12 
SMOPS, we propose the Territorial Management Contracts of Rural Areas (TMC). The 13 
potential of this instrument to be specifically applied to organic olive production systems on 14 
sloping lands is assessed. The paper then summarises the results of a survey conducted with 15 
Andalusian farmers aimed at identifying key characteristics of this instrument to enhance 16 
uptake by farming communities. Results show that farmers are well-disposed toward TMC, 17 
and that issues such as flexibility and external advice need to be considered for its successful 18 
implementation. From a policy perspective, the instrument is well aligned with the objectives 19 
of the last reform of the EU Common Agricultural Policy.  20 
 21 
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1 Introduction 29 
Agricultural abandonment is a complex multi-dimensional process driven by different economic, 30 
environmental and social factors (Verburg and Overmars, 2009; Renwick et al., 2013). Agricultural 31 
land abandonment poses severe threats to predominantly agricultural areas in the Mediterranean 32 
Region and is thus of high political interest (Weissteiner et al., 2011). Amongst other effects, 33 
agricultural land abandonment leads to a loss of income for farmers, impacts on the amenity value of 34 
agricultural landscapes, increases wildfire risk and contributes to migration from rural villages to 35 
cities. These effects in turn impact on tourism and recreation potentials of these areas, contributing to a 36 
reduction in the general economic viability of communities in agriculturally dominated areas. 37 
Mountainous agricultural systems are particularly vulnerable to the impacts of land abandonment, 38 
because they often entail high environmental value in areas where agriculture is at the heart of 39 
economic activity. According to García-Ruiz et al. (2011), farmland abandonment in Europe affects 40 
thousands of square kilometres1, and is particularly concentrated in mountainous areas, where 41 
depopulation and difficulties with the mechanisation of agricultural production already resulted in the 42 
abandonment of fields on steep slopes. Abandonment can follow different patterns in response to 43 
policy drivers. For example, the various degrees of farmland abandonment characterized by DLG and 44 
EC-LNV (2005), Pointereau (2008) and Keenleyside and Tucker (2010), -“semi-abandonment” 45 
“partial abandonment” or “cessation of productive farming”- describe situations, in which the land is 46 
not formally abandoned and is subject to some form of management. One such form of management 47 
that stands out is minimum maintenance of the orchards necessary to meet Cross-Compliance 48 
requirements (i.e.: certain environmental conditions that must be met), so that the single farm payment 49 
and other Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) payments can be claimed. This intermediate level of 50 
abandonment, however, can be seen as one step towards complete abandonment driven by factors such 51 
as ageing population and associated lack of successors, and competition with producers in more 52 
favourable locations. 53 
Traditional olive orchards on sloping terrain in the Mediterranean basin constitute a 54 
regionally important agricultural system that is particularly at risk of abandonment, because it is rarely 55 
economically sustainable (Duarte et al., 2008). The OLIVERO project investigated the environmental 56 
and socio-economic sustainability of Sloping and Mountainous Olive Production Systems (SMOPS) to 57 
assess, whether there is a future for olive production on sloping land, and identified actions that 58 
farmers and policy-makers could take (Fleskens and De Graaff, 2008). SMOPS generally encompass 59 
disadvantaged or marginal types of olive grove, in contrast to groves on flat terrain that usually are of 60 
greater productivity and economic viability (Beaufoy, 2008). Olive groves on sloping land tend to 61 
1 The ambiguity of this affirmation is due to the lack of consistent measurement across the EU to ascertain the 
current extent of abandonment (Pointereau et al., 2008). 
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have relatively low productivity, lack successors to ensure continued cultivation, suffer from soil 62 
erosion and wildfire risk and have limitations in access to markets (De Graaff et al., 2008). These 63 
characteristics are important determinants of abandonment, which, according to De Graaff et al. 64 
(2008), may affect almost 15 % of SMOPS in the medium term. However, heterogeneity also exists 65 
between SMOPS, which comprise traditional orchards, semi-intensive orchards, intensive orchards 66 
and/or organic systems (De Graaff et al., 2008). This heterogeneity implies that the different types of 67 
SMOPS face different pathways for future development. For example, some SMOPS may likely be 68 
subject to abandonment, while others may be further intensified or may give way to other production 69 
systems such as organic farming (Stroosnijder et al., 2008). Therefore, appropriate management 70 
strategies to prevent increasing abandonment need to consider both SMOPS’ distinctive features and 71 
heterogeneity.  72 
The Southern Spanish Region of Andalusia is a typical example of an area in which olive 73 
cultivation plays a major role in agricultural production, and where SMOPS are a characteristic part of 74 
the land use mosaic shaping territorial identity. Olive production is the main source of agrarian 75 
employment and constitutes the main economic activity of more than 300 municipalities (i.e. in the 39 76 
% of the region’s municipalities). In this research we focus on traditional, non-mechanised and rainfed 77 
SMOPS, which constitute the most vulnerable category among SMOPS in terms of abandonment risk. 78 
Andalusian traditional olive orchards occupy two thirds of the Region’s olive area (Cubero and Penco, 79 
2012), and 24 % of the orchards are located on mountainous land (with slope greater than 20 %). In 80 
addition to the economic and social role, traditional SMOPS in Andalusia also have a significant 81 
environmental dimension by overlapping considerably with Nature 2000 and High Nature Value 82 
Farmland (HNVF) (CAP, 2003). 83 
According to Arriaza et al. (2002), in the South of Spain land abandonment is expected to 84 
affect more than one third of SMOPS in the next decades. Duarte et al. (2008) affirmed that the 85 
abandonment of traditional SMOPS would have negative environmental consequences such as a 86 
decrease in biodiversity, increase in soil erosion and major changes to the traditional Mediterranean 87 
landscape. It would also increase the fire risk associated with abandoned land (Moravek and 88 
Zemechis, 2007). In social terms, De Graaff and Eppink (1999) highlighted the historical role of olive 89 
trees in the development of rural communities in the Mediterranean’s poor rainfed areas.  90 
Previous research has specifically proved the existence of social demand for ecosystem 91 
services provided by SMOPS. For example, Arriaza et al. (2008) found that social demand for non-92 
commodity outputs from mountain olive groves in Andalusia exists, and discussed the implications 93 
that its consideration could have in the design of future agricultural policies. Colombo et al. (2005) 94 
identified a considerable social demand to alleviate the negative off-site effects of soil erosion on 95 
pollution of water resources and conservation of biodiversity obtained by appropriate management of 96 
SMOPS. The authors also found that Andalusian citizens not only cared about the environmental 97 
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dimension of soil erosion (surface and ground water quality, landscape desertification and flora and 98 
fauna), but also for the viability of rural communities, specifically in terms of rural employment. 99 
Finally, Kallas et al. (2007) observed that mountainous olive groves help to keep rural areas 100 
populated, and contribute to erosion prevention and the amenity value of landscapes.  101 
Agri-environmental schemes are presumably nowadays a suitable policy instrument to 102 
tackle the problem of sustainability of SMOPS and, at the same time, to respond to the social demand 103 
for the ecosystem services provided by this system. However, previous policy responses have been 104 
proven to be inadequate to ensure sustainable SMOPS (Beaufoy, 2008). In this context, the lack of 105 
geographical targeting, which leads to the dispersion of contracts over large areas, emerges as an 106 
important feature (Hanley et al., 1999; ECA, 2011; Kuhfuss et al., 2013). This is because the 107 
environmental state does not improve significantly as long as the global environmental effort has not 108 
reached a minimum level of intensity, or has not been applied on a sufficient area in the zone of 109 
interest (Dupraz et al., 2009). Clearly, a jeopardised application of agri-environmental measures 110 
represents an impediment to the achievement of a minimum level of intensity in a specific area. 111 
Additionally, present agri-environmental schemes are often overly complex and include a very large 112 
number of objectives, complicating the measurement and corroboration of results (ECA, 2011).  113 
The evidence of a current trend of SMOPS abandonment, together with the social demand 114 
for the services supplied by them and the low efficiency of the current agri-environmental schemes, 115 
motivate the development of novel institutional arrangements to tackle SMOPS abandonment and its 116 
associated negative impacts. This paper focuses on Territorial Management Contracts (TMC) in Rural 117 
Areas as a policy instrument, which has been previously coined in the Andalusian Act 5/2011 118 
governing olive growing, but not yet operationalised in SMOPS. TMC are contracts between a group 119 
of farmers and the public administration, which require farmers to meet a number of commitments to 120 
improve both production-related conditions and ecological, cultural and socio-economic aspects of 121 
their farms. To the best of our knowledge, the use of collective arrangements in SMOPS has not 122 
previously been investigated in the literature, despite being an important topic in discussions regarding 123 
the CAP post 2013. Indeed, issues such as cooperation or the creation of producers’ associations are 124 
considered throughout the design of regional RDPr and are endowed with higher co-financing rates 125 
(European Commission, 2011). Furthermore, in the new CAP policy framework, measures requiring 126 
cooperation have been significantly reinforced and extended to support a wide range of types of 127 
cooperation. This includes joint contracts as an additional element of the agri-environmental measures 128 
that explicitly also cover pilot projects (European Commission, 2013).  129 
4 
The first of objective of this paper is therefore to develop a conceptual framework for TMC 130 
associated with a switch to organic farming in the context of SMOPS2, as an effective tool to increase 131 
the profitability of farming and, as a consequence, reduce the risk of abandonment. We then use data 132 
from a survey of olive farmers in Andalusian SMOPS areas to achieve our second objective: to 133 
identify likely facilitating factors and barriers to the adoption and proliferation of TMC associated 134 
with organic farming. Given the voluntary nature of TMC, participation of farmers is central to 135 
achieve policy objectives (Ruto and Garrod, 2009); therefore, a better understanding of farmers’ views 136 
and preferences regarding TMC and its implementation in SMOPS is important to support its 137 
successful and effective implementation. Finally, we would like to emphasize that the focus of this 138 
paper is not to determine ways to achieve best practice in environmental management of SMOPS, 139 
which obviously depends on a wide range of specific on-farm conditions. Rather, the paper aims to 140 
shape TMC as a policy instrument that addresses the social, economic and environmental issues that 141 
threaten the sustainability of SMOPS. 142 
The paper is structured as follows; in the next section, the main characteristics of TMC are 143 
described and it is outlined why they can be an effective tool to increase the profitability of SMOPS, 144 
particularly if implemented in association with organic farming. Section 3 introduces the case study 145 
and the questionnaire used to collect information on farmers and their views regarding TMC as 146 
proposed. Results are then discussed along with their policy implications in Section 4. Finally, Section 147 
5 presents the main conclusions of the study. 148 
2 Territorial Management Contracts in Rural Areas associated to organic farming: a new 149 
tool for the SMOPS’ management 150 
2.1 The structure of TMC 151 
The first attempt to implement a TMC type arrangement was implemented in France, by means of the 152 
“contrats d’aménagement du territoire” (CTE)3. CTE were proposed as development tools in a 153 
territorial strategy of agri-rural development (Velasco and Moyano, 2007). The results achieved by 154 
these contracts with farmers were mixed. The great number of large farms which enrolled in CTE and 155 
the resulting increase in associated financial requirements hampered the accomplishment of the initial 156 
CTE’s objectives, consolidating the interests of the existing production systems and models rather than 157 
promoting territorial development dynamics (Chia and Dulcire 2008; Viladomiu et al., 2007). Dulcire 158 
2 It should be clarified that the implementation of TMC does not have to be necessarily restrained to organic 
olive farming in SMOPS. Indeed, collective approaches have been suggested in the last reform of the CAP 
irrespective of the crop or the area considered as a tool to enhance a better performance of agri-environmental 
measures. However, in the current research we have confined its application to organic SMOPS because of 
several inherent characteristics of this system such as its high risk of abandonment, its cost structure and the 
relevance to small-scale farming.  
3 This concept was introduced in the French Act of July the 9th 1999, governing Agricultural Orientation.  
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et al. (2006) stated that CTE have rarely served to promote the participation of farmers in the 159 
sustainable and integrated management of the territory or to initiate new projects. Additionally, the 160 
long list of management actions that could be included in the CTE led to patchy outcomes that were 161 
barely visible at a territorial level. However, Arroyo (2008) affirms that, despite the lack of a 162 
successful implementation of CTE in France4, the institutional framework and its legal basis could 163 
easily be transferred to other countries to integrate the concept of multifuncionality into farm 164 
management. This is what we believe applies to SMOPS. 165 
The concept of TMC for SMOPS proposed here differs substantially from the CTE originally 166 
implemented in France and avoids their main barriers to success. Main differences are the collective 167 
character of the contracts, and the intrinsically small area of the farms in SMOPS. Collective 168 
approaches to agri-environmental schemes have also been implemented in the United Kingdom, the 169 
Netherlands or Finland. In the Netherlands, collective approaches have been successfully implemented 170 
over the past 15 years by agrarian nature associations, demonstrating that the delivery of agri-171 
environmental measures by farmers’ associations can be more effective than by individual farmers 172 
(Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and Innovation, 2011). One of the key factors to 173 
achieve this success has been to ground the associations on a coherent and integrated local programme 174 
defined by local farmers themselves (Dutch Ministry of Economic Affairs, Agriculture and 175 
Innovation, 2011). In the UK context, Davies et al. (2004) report various small scale projects for 176 
collective action in Scotland, which have demonstrated a potential for achieving environmental gains 177 
and improving the linkages among farmers and between farmers and other stakeholders. However, 178 
according to the authors, significant changes are needed in both farmers’ attitudes and the incentive 179 
structures offered to them to achieve a successful implementation of collective action at a larger scale. 180 
From a more general perspective, difficulties of finding support and advice, the eligibility of 181 
costs, the ownership of the land, the lack of trust in associative entities, the considerable administrative 182 
burden and the lack of clear environmental focus were found to be obstacles to TMC implementation 183 
(European Network for Rural Development, 2011). These aspects should, therefore, be taken into 184 
account in the design stage. Despite the existence of potential issues outlined below, the collective 185 
character of TMC supports territorial development objectives, avoids problems of dispersed uptake, 186 
and facilitates the monitoring and verification of outcomes. Likewise, focusing the implementation of 187 
TMC on small farms will avoid allocating a considerable budget to only a small set of beneficiaries, 188 
therefore contributing to distributional equity and enhancing the social legitimacy of the measure 189 
(Rocamora-Montiel et al., 2014).  190 
4 This author asserts that the implementation was determined by many external controversies, which reduced 
their efficiency. 
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In TMC, a group of farmers agree to meet a number of commitments, which are described in 191 
an action plan and serve as a benchmark for verification of expected outcomes by the contracting 192 
parties (administration and the group of farmers). The action plan will also serve as a means to cope 193 
with the inherent heterogeneity of SMOPS, since it will enable the alignment of the general TMC 194 
requirements and goals to the specific characteristics of the area of implementation. Figure 1 illustrates 195 
the basic structure of TMC. 196 
Source: Own elaboration 197 
FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 198 
Figure 1: Diagram of the TMC’s structure 199 
Two aspects are crucial and distinctive characteristics of TMC for SMOPS: the collective 200 
character of the contracts, and the consideration of spatial connectivity. SMOPS are typically farmed 201 
on a small plot scale. For example, the average olive farm size in Andalusia is less than 5 hectares 202 
(Gómez-Limón and Arriaza, 2011). As such, individual micro-management of SMOPS creates a 203 
mixture of agricultural patches with different characteristics and environmental outcomes, where 204 
positive synergies arise only accidentally. Goldman et al. (2007) affirm that the potential of 205 
agricultural landscapes to provide ecosystem services often depends on the joint management5 of 206 
farms. Collective and spatially connected management improves habitat connectivity through the 207 
creation of boundary features, which increase habitat edge effects, thus being beneficial for 208 
biodiversity, an issue of particular importance to high value environmental areas (Franks and 209 
McGloin, 2007).  210 
Along the same line, the European Commission (2011) asserts that the synergies resulting 211 
from commitments undertaken jointly by a group of farmers multiply the environmental and climate 212 
benefits of agri-environmental payments. Collective approaches to agri-environmental contracts are 213 
considered to yield greater environmental benefits than separate actions of individual farmers. At the 214 
same time, collective management can improve cost-effectiveness and efficiency through targeted 215 
investments (European Network for Rural Development, 2011). From an economic perspective, 216 
collective management of small farms creates economies of scale, reducing production costs (Ruz, 217 
2012). Likewise, it favours the centralization of supply, which facilitates commercialization and 218 
reduces the cost of distribution of the products (PAAE, 2007). In the case of olive orchards, Ruz 219 
(2012) suggests that collective management of about 50 perfectly connected hectares can achieve 220 
significant economic gains. Of course, the achievement of an ‘optimal’ degree of spatial connectivity 221 
may not be feasible in practice. However, suboptimal connections of SMOPS can still provide a 222 
5 Joint management and other terms such as collective management do refer to the same concept that aims to be 
achieved by TMC. 
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considerable improvement over the status quo with respect to the economic and environmental 223 
outcomes, and can be feasible to be achieved. For example, Colombo and Camacho-Castillo (2014) 224 
identified several areas in the study region where it would be possible to implement TMC involving 50 225 
hectares of SMOPS out of 100 hectares of land.  226 
According to Ciani et al. (2012), TMC give greater functionality to the role of the 227 
agricultural sector, improve liquidity of farm businesses and stimulate the use and dissemination of 228 
information and communication technologies for monitoring and control activities. From a social 229 
perspective, Ruz (2012) points out that TMC are an important instrument to tackle the problem of 230 
generational renewal, which is a common issue in a considerable proportion of SMOPS. In this case, 231 
the farmers’ association created ad hoc for the implementation of the contracts could assume the 232 
management of those farms with owners who are not willing to continue with their farming activity. 233 
Finally, the European Commission (2011) predicts that support for small operators to organise joint 234 
work processes and share facilities and resources should help them to become economically viable, 235 
despite their small scale. 236 
A third characteristic of the proposed TMC in SMOPS is the conversion to organic farming. 237 
That is, the collective and spatially connected SMOPS formed under a TMC should be organically 238 
farmed6. The transformation to organic farming represents an opportunity to strengthen the 239 
sustainability of traditional mountainous olive production systems (De Graaff et al., 2008), because of 240 
the higher financial profitability of organic olive oil compared to conventionally produced oil, the 241 
enhanced supply of ecosystem services and the similar production costs7. The benefits of organic 242 
farming in traditional mountainous olive production systems have been previously analysed by several 243 
authors. Rocamora-Montiel et al. (2013) found that organic farming in Andalusian traditional SMOPS 244 
delivers a wider set of environmental and social goods and services than conventional farming, on top 245 
of the implementation of Cross Compliance in CAP, which has led to an overall decrease in the 246 
negative environmental impact of conventional farming. De Graaff et al. (2008) observed that even 247 
after considering the reduced productivity and the higher risk of pests and diseases, organic farming 248 
offers opportunities to SMOPS due to the higher price of the products, the development of eco-tourism 249 
6 It is important to recognize that this requirement is not compulsory. In this paper we consider the conversion to 
organic farming, because on average the conversion to organic farming of SMOPS is expected to bring positive 
environmental, social and economic effects. However, TMC can be implemented in integrated and conventional 
agriculture where, under some specific conditions, they may even deliver larger benefits relative to the ones 
obtained through organic farming. 
7 The gap between the production costs of organic and traditional olive orchards narrowed considerably in the 
past decade due to the improvement of organic management of the orchards, the availability of more efficient 
inputs and the implementation of Cross Compliance. For example, De Graaff et al. (2011) observed that the 
latter increased the average cost of SMOPS’ farming with between 1 % and 10 % (10% applying for traditional 
SMOPS and 1 % for the most intensive ones). Guzmán et al. (2010) found that on average the production costs 
of organic olive orchards are 1.4 % higher than in conventional systems, with an interval which goes from – 23 
% to + 19 % . 
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activities and the availability of specific subsidies. Sanz and García (2013) affirm that the 250 
implementation of organic management in traditional SMOPS balances out the disadvantages that this 251 
system suffers in terms of productivity and costs. Moreover, according to the same authors, organic 252 
production in SMOPS generates a significantly higher profitability compared to conventional 253 
management due to the higher market prices for organic oil both in retail and wholesale markets. 254 
However, despite the above mentioned advantages, organic farming has been adopted on a relatively 255 
low share of the Andalusian olive growing area. According to Colombo and Sayadi (2010), this can be 256 
attributed to difficulties faced by producers to process organic products (e.g., the absence of organic 257 
oil mills); the lack of distribution channels and access to markets; and the insufficient information and 258 
knowledge regarding the management of organic production. Therefore, organic farming in traditional 259 
SMOPS is still controversial. According to the findings of Gómez et al. (2008), there is a large degree 260 
of heterogeneity in the outcomes of organic farming, which depend on a set of local environmental 261 
and structural conditions. However, the adoption of organic farming should be interpreted only as one 262 
basis for the implementation of TMC. The improved environmental performance of SMOPS fostered 263 
by TMC should go beyond organic farming commitments. For example, as pointed out by Gomez et 264 
al. (2008), financial support in SMOPS could be linked to specific additional soil and water 265 
conservation measures that go beyond organic management and that can be important to attain the 266 
environmental sustainability of these systems. 267 
2.2 TMC and the agricultural policy 268 
From a policy makers’ perspective, it is essential to understand how TMC associated with organic 269 
farming can be embedded in the agricultural policy framework. Agri-environmental payments are 270 
typically used to encourage uptake of farming practices that enhance the environmental performance 271 
of farms. TMC associated with organic farming may qualify as an additional agri-environmental 272 
measure. In the forthcoming policy framework, collective agri-environmental schemes are likely to be 273 
adopted, providing the institutional basis for such implementation. However, given the large degree of 274 
heterogeneity of areas including SMOPS in terms of environmental and social conditions, the positive 275 
externalities generated by TMC are not expected to be generated homogeneously throughout the 276 
regions. Therefore, the expected outcomes and payments of TMC should be defined on the basis of the 277 
specific characteristics of the area they refer to (Ciani et al. 2012). 278 
Such an approach would likely lead to an increase in transaction and verification costs for 279 
both private and public bodies. However, tailoring agri-environmental payments to local conditions 280 
(as, for example, in the case of TMC) may contribute to improving the effectiveness of the instruments 281 
in achieving environmental outcomes. This is supported by the mixed success of agri-environmental 282 
measures in achieving environmental conservation objectives (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003; Kleijn et 283 
al., 2006; Batary et al., 2011). Additionally, recent research suggests that it may be worth bearing the 284 
additional costs avoided by policy simplification. Armsworth et al. (2012) find that it is likely to be 285 
9 
worth to pursue a more complicated policy that involves spatial targeting, even if the additional 286 
implementation costs of doing so would constitute a substantial proportion of the overall budget. 287 
Similarly Pannell et al. (2013) find that the additional transaction costs borne by the public 288 
administration in the process of applying more complex incentive designs would be easily outweighed 289 
by the additional environmental benefits generated. 290 
Further, the spatial connectivity of SMOPS under TMC emerges as an important 291 
opportunity to reduce the costs associated with the verification of environmental outcomes. The public 292 
body no longer needs to inspect each single parcel, but can optimise the process of verification of 293 
outcomes on a larger scale. Therefore, a general increase in program efficiency is expected for the 294 
collective and spatially connected management of SMOPS: farmers receive payments that are 295 
proportional to outcomes provided, which differ between SMOPS areas, while the number of eligible 296 
projects is lower and the costs of monitoring and verification of the expected results are reduced 297 
through collective management.  298 
Currently, all SMOPS receive some kind of public support in terms of single farm payment, 299 
or through rural development measures such as ‘Less Favoured Areas’ (LFA), or agri-environmental 300 
payments. Due to the collective structure of TMC, all of these support mechanisms may be joined into 301 
an overall support to the contracting farmers’ association. Private landowners would face a trade-off 302 
between the extra costs incurred by being a member of the association (mainly transaction costs) and 303 
the benefits gained due to utilising economies of scale. In this context, the new CAP policy framework 304 
allows member states to pay a surplus of 30 % to support agri-environmental schemes that are 305 
collectively managed to compensate for the additional transaction costs.  306 
3 Farmers’ views on TMC 307 
3.1  Survey design and study area 308 
To gather information on farmers’ attitudes towards the proposed TMC and organic farming, a sample 309 
of farmers8 was interviewed between September 2011 and March 2012 in face-to-face interviews 310 
using a structured questionnaire. Two slightly different versions of questionnaires9 were administered 311 
to organic and to conventional farmers. Both versions had four parts. In the first part, information 312 
about farmers’ characteristics was gathered. The second part aimed at collecting information about the 313 
current management of the farms by inquiring farmers on aspects related to the farm’s profitability, 314 
their views on the future of SMOPS, the importance of external advisers, and about the importance of 315 
several key factors in guiding farming decisions, including environmental concerns. In the third part 316 
8 The interviewees were selected considering whether they had the authority to take decisions concerning the 
management of the farms, regardless of whether they were full-time farmers or not. 
9 Translated versions of both questionnaires are available as supplementary material 
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farmers were firstly informed and then asked about their position towards a proposed TMC. An 317 
information package was used to describe the structure and functioning of TMC associated with 318 
organic management of SMOPS to farmers. They were informed that the hypothetical TMC required 319 
each of the members of the newly ad hoc formed association for collective management to follow the 320 
rules established by its steering panel. It was clearly explained that the association involved in the 321 
TMC has to create a management plan that details all the proposed actions that maintain or improve 322 
the productive, economic, social, environmental and cultural assets of the enrolled areas. Depending 323 
on the achieved outcomes related to these actions, the public administration would offer a certain 324 
payment. Several examples were provided to farmers to explain which actions may be covered, and 325 
how payments are tied to outcomes. We also summarised the advantages and drawbacks of a 326 
collective management of the olive orchards. Farmers were subsequently asked about their willingness 327 
to take part in a hypothetical TMC. If the response was positive, they were asked to rate a set of 328 
characteristics, which described the TMC’s functioning. This information is useful for identifying 329 
features that could increase the likelihood of farmers’ enrolment. Those farmers who agreed on taking 330 
part in the hypothetical TMC were further inquired about their willingness to pay for its establishment. 331 
Those who rejected the idea of participating were asked about their reasons and were subsequently 332 
asked to state their willingness to accept compensation to take part in the TMC. The questionnaire 333 
ends by asking respondents about their socio-demographic characteristics. 334 
The survey was conducted in the municipalities Constantina and Cazalla de la Sierra, both 335 
belonging to the Province of Seville (Andalusia, Spain), as shown in Figure 2. Both municipalities are 336 
located in the North of the Province of Seville and belong to the “Sierra Norte” district. The selection 337 
of these municipalities is based on the findings of Colombo and Camacho-Castillo (2011), who 338 
applied a set of territorial and environmental indexes to determine the suitability of all municipalities 339 
of Andalusia to implement TMC in SMOPS. Based on this analysis, they conclude that these 340 
municipalities exhibit favourable conditions for an efficient implementation of TMC. The agricultural 341 
sector is the main economic sector in terms of employment in Constantina (61 % of employment). In 342 
addition, it represents the main activity for 47 % of the enterprises in the municipality. In Cazalla, 40 343 
% of employment and 32 % of the enterprises are directly related to the agricultural sector (Caja 344 
España-Caja Duero, 2011).  345 
The “Sierra Norte” district is an example of a typical mixture of Mediterranean mountainous 346 
and agricultural areas, where olive orchards coexist with forestry, pasture, holm and cork oaks. In the 347 
chosen municipalities, almost all of the SMOPS lie in Natura 2000 designated areas, underscoring the 348 
importance of organic management. The population of the area has been decreasing since the middle 349 
of the 20th century. Currently, this trend appears to have stabilised. The average yearly change in the 350 
population rate in Constantina and Cazalla has been -0.55 % between 2003 and 2010 (Caja España-351 
Caja Duero, 2011). The farmers’ population is aging. 70 % of farmers in Cazalla and 64 % in 352 
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Constantina are older than 55 years. This may constitute a threat to the future of SMOPS, especially if 353 
the generational renewal of the farmers is limited. 354 
Source: Own elaboration 355 
FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE 356 
Figure 2: Situation of the studied area 357 
3.2 Sample features 358 
Farmers to be interviewed were selected from the list of farmers who belong to the main commercial 359 
local cooperatives, which comprise most of the olive production of the area. In the sampling procedure 360 
we considered representativeness in terms of gender and age. It was not possible to consider 361 
representativeness with respect to other socioeconomic aspects (such educational level), because the 362 
agrarian population data are not disaggregated for other variables at municipal level. The final sample 363 
includes 187 farmers, amongst which 100 use conventional and 87 organic production systems. The 364 
main socio-demographic characteristics are described in Table 1. The majority has a low education 365 
level and has been working as a farmer for the last 30 years. The mean age is almost 60 years, 366 
reflecting the ageing of the farming population in the area. The sample is representative of the 367 
population of farmers in terms of the age (χ24=4.7, P = 0.31), but differs in terms of gender (χ21= 13.1, 368 
P=0.00) with a higher proportion of male farmers in the sample.  369 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 370 
Table 1: Sample features 371 
3.3 Survey results 372 
3.3.1 Opinions about the farm’s management 373 
An important element associated with effective collective management of SMOPS is the sharing of 374 
knowledge and information between farmers, and the consultation of agricultural extension services. 375 
Parra-López et al. (2007) observed that the transmission of knowledge amongst organic farmers in 376 
SMOPS is an effective tool for the diffusion and adoption of organic farming, where often the 377 
producers need advice on their management from either the government’s agricultural service or, if 378 
unavailable, from other (organic) farmers. The questionnaire inquired farmers about the frequency of 379 
contacting their neighbours or the technicians of the agricultural extension service to resolve problems 380 
related to farming (questions 2.7 and 2.8). Results indicate that farmers barely take advice from the 381 
agricultural extension service and even less so from other farmers. Only 17.6 % of the interviewees 382 
make use of the extension service at least twice a year, while 63 % of the sample stated to have never 383 
contacted a neighbour to solve doubts regarding farming-related issues. To scrutinize whether the 384 
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willingness to take external advises is linked to either farmers’ characteristics or production systems, a 385 
binary logistic regression is carried out, where the binary dependent variable takes the value 1 if the 386 
farmers have taken advice during the past year from the agricultural extension service, and 0 if they 387 
have not. The independent variables are a set of socio-economic and farm characteristics. Results 388 
indicate that the farmers’ age and the type of production system are key determining factors in 389 
distinguishing those farmers who never consult the agricultural extension service from those who do, 390 
revealing that young and organic farmers are more likely to ask for external advice. 391 
Organic farmers were also inquired about their willingness to advise other farmers about the 392 
organic management (question 3.4.a). A clear division was found between those farmers who do not 393 
perceive themselves to be sufficiently qualified to offer advice to other farmers (52.9 %); and those 394 
who are willing to advise other farmers concerning organic farming (43.5 %). The latter could 395 
complement the work of the extension service, currently understaffed to cope to cope with the demand 396 
for advice. 397 
When asked to rate the main aspects guiding farming decisions (question 2.9; results shown 398 
in Table 2), conventional farmers, on average, indicated the commercialization of the olives as being 399 
the most important, whilst the majority of organic farmers quoted the protection of the environment as 400 
a key aspect. Both groups agreed that minimising production risks is of the least importance. 401 
Interestingly, maximising economic profit was not amongst the most important aspects considered in 402 
production decisions10. This is possibly due to the fact that farming in SMOPS often only constitutes a 403 
small share of farmers’ overall income. Indeed, 35.3 % of the interviewed farmers affirm that 404 
agriculture constitutes a secondary activity for income generation. This percentage rises to 54.5 % for 405 
those farmers conducting agriculture as a marginal economic activity. Thus, farming may mainly be 406 
kept up for cultural and bequest reasons by a majority of land owners. This is also observed by 407 
Renwick and Revoredo-Giha (2013), who state that landowners often continue uneconomic farming 408 
for a variety of cultural and social reasons.  409 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 410 
Table 2: Main aspects guiding farming decisions 411 
Non-organic farmers were asked if they had ever considered a switch to organic farming 412 
(question 2.21). 60 % answered negatively, most of them simply stating that they had never thought 413 
about changing their production system. 35 % of farmers stated that they had considered switching to 414 
organic farming but had not changed their production system yet; noteworthy, the majority of these 415 
10 This comment does not apply to the small portion of farmers (5%) for whom agriculture is the exclusive 
economic activity. As it may be expected they scored the maximization of economic profit as the most important 
aspect. 
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farmers state the small surface of their farms as one of the main impediments for the transformation to 416 
organic. This is particularly interesting in the case of collective management, because this constraint 417 
would not apply anymore. Finally, the remaining 5 % stated that they were farming organically in the 418 
past, but had abandoned it. 419 
3.3.2 Profitability and future of the exploitations 420 
The sampled farmers’ views regarding profitability, production costs and perceived risk of organic 421 
olive cultivation in SMOPS are reported in Table 3 for organic and conventional farmers (questions 422 
2.13, 2.14, 2.15, 2.16 and 2.18). 423 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 424 
Table 3: Organic vs. conventional farmers’ views concerning the economic profitability of organic farming. 425 
Overall, a majority of both organic and conventional farmers agreed that organic farming is 426 
the most profitable system in this area. Both groups asserted that this is due to the agri-environmental 427 
subsidies paid to organic farms and the higher market price of organic olive oil relative to 428 
conventionally produced oil. However, at the same time, more organic farmers than conventional ones 429 
(21.8 % vs. 9.0 %) declared that the organic system is less profitable than the conventional one, 430 
indicating that there is a large heterogeneity in the farmers’ expectation about the profitability of 431 
organic farming. Almost a fifth of the conventional farmers were unable to state an opinion about the 432 
relative profitability, production costs and risks associated with organic farming. The majority of 433 
farmers agreed that both systems have similar production costs, which likely reflects the fact that costs 434 
are mainly determined by the inherent characteristics of SMOPS rather than by the production system 435 
itself. This is also confirmed by Guzmán et al. (2010) and Rocamora-Montiel et al. (2013), who report 436 
similar production costs for the two production systems. Finally, both groups concurred with each 437 
other that production risks do not differ much between conventional and organic farming. The most 438 
noteworthy observation, despite the observed heterogeneity, is that conventional farmers tend to 439 
consider organic farming in SMOPS the more profitable production system, a fact that should 440 
facilitate the conversion of their farms to organic production within the TMC.  441 
3.3.3 Attitudes and preferences toward TMC 442 
After introducing the TMC concept, farmers were asked about their willingness to take part in a 443 
producers’ association linked to TMC implementation (question 3.1). 18 % of farmers were willing to 444 
take part in the association unconditionally, whilst 77 % declared to be interested in participating 445 
depending on the commitments required. The rest of the sample (5 %) was not interested to 446 
participate. We found a large correlation between the general willingness to take part in a TMC and 447 
farmers’ income. All the farmers whose income relies principally or entirely on agriculture declared to 448 
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be interested in participating11. On the contrary, the 5 % of the sample not willing to participate are 449 
farmers for whom agriculture only represents a marginal share of their total income. 450 
Table 4 summarises the farmers’ views regarding a set of defining characteristics of the 451 
TMC (questions 3.2.a and 3.2.b). The feature rated highest by both organic and conventional farmers 452 
is the possibility of leaving the association without being penalised, which clearly indicates a need for 453 
a “flexible” design of TMC. Of course, it would not be practical to implement TMC at a large scale, if 454 
participants can leave the agreement without any penalty. However, to include a penalty for leaving 455 
the TMC would drastically reduce the willingness of farmers to participate. As such, the 456 
implementation of the instrument should be tested in the field at local scale first to identify the 457 
minimum requirements to guarantee the functioning of the TMC. Such field tests could be set-up 458 
experimentally, i.e. by varying the contracting requirements, to assess the implications for 459 
participation and performance of the TMC. The second most important characteristic was the 460 
bureaucracy and paperwork to be administered by the association involved in the TMC. This 461 
illustrates the difficulties faced by farmers to cope with the increasing administrative burden 462 
associated with farming, and advocates for a design of a TMC which eases this burden to farmers as 463 
much as possible.  464 
The presence of a technician is also rated highly. Here, a statistical difference12 is observed 465 
between organic and conventional farmers (t=2.43, p=0.016), revealing that organic farmers consider 466 
the presence of an external adviser more important. This may be expected given that organic 467 
management is a relatively “new” concept, where erroneous management decisions can have serious 468 
implications on the profitability of the farm. The commercialization of the olives or the olive oil 469 
follows in the order of importance. Organic and conventional farmers differ statistically significantly 470 
in their response to all questions regarding the role of the association in the harvest and the 471 
commercialization of the olive oil (characteristics 4, 6 and 7 in Table 4); organic farmers assign 472 
greater importance to the fact that the association supports the harvest of olives and, subsequently, acts 473 
as seller of the organic olive oil, preferably using its own brand. This reflects the concerns of organic 474 
farmers to not be able to trade all the oil as organic and, as such, to not benefit from the added value 475 
associated with organic oil. Conventional farmers assign less importance to this aspect of the 476 
association, whilst they place greater importance on the freedom of managing the farm in a self-477 
determined way. Statistical tests reveal that, compared to conventional farmers, organic farmers show 478 
a greater willingness to forgo the freedom of managing the farm in a self-determined way, and as a 479 
consequence, to follow the association’s directives. Both groups consider it very important to have a 480 
11 On average, producers whose incomes rely entirely or principally on agriculture hold larger SMOPS areas 
compared to the rest of producers, for whom agriculture is not their main economic activity. Therefore, their 
willingness to participate in the association would ease the achievement of the minimum area required to obtain 
the expected benefits from collective management. 
12 t-tests were used in the analysis. 
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certain degree of flexibility in the management of the orchards regarding the working dates imposed 481 
by the association. Concretely, a time window of two weeks was indicated as suitable for initiating the 482 
soil preparation, applying weeding and entering the harvesting stage. 483 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 484 
Table 4: TMC’s characteristics valued by respondents. 485 
Those farmers who accepted to take part in the TMC either unconditionally or conditionally 486 
were subsequently inquired about their willingness to transfer the entire management of their SMOPS 487 
to the association  (question 3.5). A transfer of management responsibilities to the association can help 488 
to address the problem of ageing farmers and the lack of generational renewal. Ruz (2012) points out 489 
that the association can constitute a “professional farmer” and thus optimise the collective 490 
management of the orchards. It was explained that farmers who subscribe to a complete transfer of 491 
management to the association will in return receive either a previously determined payment, or a 492 
payment that depends on the financial profit made by the association.  493 
The majority of farmers refused the proposal of an integral management of orchards by the 494 
association. However, 19 % stated that the possibility of transferring management responsibilities to 495 
the association is a good idea. Of these farmers, 61 % declared that they required a minimum payment 496 
of 550 € per hectare to transfer management of their orchards to the association13, whilst the remaining 497 
farmers were willing to accept a payment proportional to the financial results of the association.  498 
Finally, those farmers who accepted to participate in the TMC were asked about the sum of 499 
money they are prepared to pay to have the association created (questions 3.6 and 3.7). 32 % of 500 
respondents were willing to pay an average sum of 22.6 €/ha (std. deviation= 2.0). The remaining 68 501 
% reported that they cannot afford a payment, although they are generally interested in participating. 502 
Those farmers who were not willing to join to the association were asked about their willingness to 503 
accept compensation in return for enrolling their farms into the association (question 3.8). Paying a 504 
compensation for participation may be justified, because a “minimum” level of spatial connectivity is 505 
required to maximise the environmental benefits resulting from the association. Amongst the group of 506 
farmers not interested in joining the association, 75 % rejected to be paid for including their farms in 507 
it. The average compensation demanded by the remaining 25 % is 341 € per hectare. 508 
4 Discussion and policy implications 509 
The new Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) emerges as a decisive benchmark for the analysis of the 510 
results of this study, since the definitive agreement post 2013 is going to significantly influence both 511 
13 In the studied area, farmers are currently receiving an average of 250 €/ha through the Single Farm Payment 
Scheme. The agri-environmental subsidy for organic farms sums up to 370 €/ha. 
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the future of SMOPS and the evolution of TMC. Therefore, it is useful to link the results of this study 512 
to key issues of the new CAP, which is going to affect the public financial support for SMOPS. This 513 
joint analysis will shed light on suitable ways to define promising instruments that can be used to 514 
enhance the sustainability of SMOPS. 515 
The European Commission, the European Parliament and the Council have reached a 516 
political agreement concerning the definitive CAP post 2013. However several points are left to be set 517 
at national level and are still pending agreement. In the Commission’s initial Legal Proposals 518 
published in October 2011, the main changes were clearly taking shape: the forthcoming policy was 519 
likely to contain a greener and more equitably distributed first pillar and a second pillar focusing more 520 
on competitiveness, climate change and the environment. In these proposals, various references were 521 
made to the importance of LFA and of HNVF, where SMOPS could be positioned. The definitive 522 
agreement has maintained these early proposals, but several changes and specifications have been 523 
introduced. In the first pillar, the definition of the Greening Payment, which will represent 30 % of the 524 
national envelope, will finally not affect permanent crops (Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y 525 
Alimentación, 2014). Also, the schemes regarding LFA and Small Farmers (both optional for Member 526 
States), emerge as key issues for SMOPS. In the second pillar, the possibility of designing thematic 527 
sub-programmes that could be awarded with higher rates of support was included for thematic areas 528 
such as small farms, mountain areas, climate change mitigation / adaptation or biodiversity. 529 
Collaboration between farmers is considered in several instruments, for example in the measure 530 
termed “co-operation”, which offers possibilities to support technological, environmental and 531 
commercial cooperation; in the measure “producer groups / organisations offering support for setting 532 
up groups / organisations of small and medium-sized enterprises on the basis of a business plan”; or in 533 
the “agri-environment - climate payments”, where joint contracts are likely to play an important role. 534 
The importance of organic farming is reinforced. It has been separated from the “agri-environment - 535 
climate payments” in order to achieve greater visibility (European Commission, 2013).  536 
At national level, the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture (Ministerio de Agricultura Pesca y 537 
Alimentación, 2013) has stressed that the conversion to organic farming in some mountainous areas 538 
will bring important benefits to the environment and aid in the maintenance of a viable population in 539 
these areas. The SMOPS sector published a manifesto in December 2012 (Olivar de Sierra, 2012), 540 
which highlights the importance of olive farming in mountainous areas and provides evidence that 541 
achieving a sound rural development in Andalusia is not possible without the recognition of SMOPS 542 
in development programmes. In the manifesto, specific support is demanded for TMC, greening 543 
measures and for a specific scheme for HNVF. The sector also demands the inclusion of a special 544 
programme for SMOPS in the Rural Development Policy that would sit alongside Natura 2000 areas, 545 
organic farming and the HNVF. They also called for the establishment of new criteria for a fairer 546 
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budget distribution, with additional payments made based on the environmental and social services 547 
provided. 548 
From a social perspective, it was expected that the CAP post 2013 would have moved from 549 
an action-oriented policy to a target-oriented scheme (Rutz and Schramek, 2013), recognising that 550 
actions do not always guarantee the desired results (Kleijn and Sutherland, 2003; Whittingham, 2007). 551 
Although the current reform has not performed a categorical shift toward this target-oriented approach, 552 
the inclusion of alternative instruments promoting cooperation, the spatial concentration of the farms 553 
and the collective management in search of a better performance of agri-environmental payments have 554 
to be considered as the beginning of a new path toward the paradigm change expected for the future 555 
CAP post 2020.  556 
Within this policy context, TMC associated with the conversion to organic farming are well 557 
aligned with the main elements of the CAP reform and the observed needs at European, national and 558 
regional level. The proposed instrument is expected to improve the sustainability of SMOPS by 559 
increasing their economic, social and environmental performance. Under the CAP structure, the most 560 
likely way to put TMC into practise would be through the Region’s RDPr, and especially through agri-561 
environmental schemes and measures aimed at promoting cooperation. The RDPr’s measures should 562 
provide the general framework, where the definitive instruments (action plan of the association and 563 
resulting TMC) have to be designed. For example, the RDPr’s measures could define which actions 564 
are compulsory (e.g., adoption of organic farming, minimum area of joint management of X hectares, 565 
minimum number of members, etc.), and which are left to for the association to decide (e.g., which 566 
management or trading scheme to follow). Following this approach, the inherent characteristics of the 567 
territory where TMC are rolled out can be taken into account through the actions and measures that the 568 
association is free to decide upon. Indeed, according to Espinosa-Goded et al. (2010), a regional 569 
approach to the design of agri-environmental measures is appropriate both from the perspective of 570 
potential savings that can be achieved and based on cost-effectiveness. As such, it is possible that 571 
TMC lead to different final implementations in terms of management and organisation, depending on 572 
the characteristics of the areas where they are performed.  573 
Importantly, and different to the current “action-oriented” agri-environmental schemes, the 574 
payments will be proportional to the benefits generated. As such, it is necessary that the parties 575 
involved in TMC (the public administration and the farmers’ associations) agree on the status quo 576 
conditions and on the approach to verification of the results. These conditions can be met by involving 577 
currently active certification agencies for organic agriculture, which have the best knowledge and 578 
technology required for verifying the environmental impacts from agriculture. For example, for 579 
measures focused on the maintenance of the ecological value of SMOPS landscape, the payment could 580 
be based on the accumulation of bonus points for specific actions and outcomes carried out in the 581 
different farm habitats (Niederösterreichischer Oekopunte Verein, 2011). The measurement of these 582 
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outcomes requires the development of effective indicators (Burton and Schwarz, 2013), that, among 583 
other requirements, have to necessarily be clearly attributable to specific management actions (Zabel 584 
and Roe, 2009). For example, for those measures aimed at improving biodiversity, the indicator list 585 
should contain a number of species groups (Roth et al., 2008) that should be spatially comparable for 586 
any given agricultural unit (Matzdorf et al., 2008) and represent the variety of habitats in the 587 
programme area (Wittig et al., 2006; Haaren and Bathke, 2008). The public administrator could set up 588 
a stepwise payment system with tranches proportional to the achievement of the anticipated results. 589 
This payment should cover the costs borne by farmers to implement the required measures, including 590 
transaction costs, and include a surplus to incentivise the farmers’ enrolment in TMC14. The final 591 
value should be proportional to the social demand for the provision of the environmental and social 592 
services generated by SMOPS. Future research may identify the maximum amount of payment that is 593 
socially legitimised by quantifying the citizens’ maximum willingness to pay for the provision of these 594 
externalities by SMOPS.  595 
The collective character of TMC reduces the costs associated with the monitoring and 596 
verification of outcomes. As pointed out by Schwarz et al. (2008), the lack of economies of scale is 597 
considered as a key aspect of the high administration and transaction costs of both the current action-598 
based agri-environmental schemes and alternative result-based approaches. Under TMC, the public 599 
body no longer needs to inspect each single parcel, and optimises the process of verification of 600 
outcomes on a larger scale. By means of an adequate experimental design, it will be possible to outline 601 
a representative sampling that would allow reducing the number of farms needed to be inspected 602 
within a TMC.  603 
The survey results point to aspects that are important for a successful design and 604 
implementation of TMC in the SMOPS. First, TMC must be set up in a way that allows dissatisfied 605 
farmers to abandon the contract without penalties, and in a way that reduces administration efforts. 606 
The positive influence of contract termination possibilities on farmers’ willingness to enrol in a 607 
scheme is corroborated by several studies (Christensen et al., 2011; Espinosa-Goded et al., 2010; 608 
Broch and Vedel, 2012; Wilson and Hart, 2001). For example, Broch and Vedel (2012) found that the 609 
introduction of an option to cancel an agri-environmental contract within a limited period of time can 610 
greatly improve farmers’ willingness to accept contracts at lower cost for society. In the specific case 611 
of TMC, this may be achieved by incorporating payments in tranches according to the achieved 612 
results. In case a farmer leaves the association before the end of the contract term, s/he will not be 613 
penalised, but s/he will not receive the full payment established in the contract. Farmers would also 614 
reject any new instrument that would increase the administrative burden. As such, TMC should be 615 
administered by a representative of the farmers’ association, and farmers would directly interact with 616 
14 It is worth to note that the forthcoming policy, in the context of collective agri-environmental measures, 
increased the share of the payments used to cover transaction costs from 20 % to 30 % of the total payments.  
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this representative and thus avoid any extra administrative work. The reduction of administrative 617 
burden, and hence farmers’ transaction costs, has been observed crucial for the success of TMC in 618 
previous cases (European Network for Rural Development, 2011).  619 
Second, TMC should incentivise the presence of an adviser, who serves as a reference for all 620 
members to address the farmers’ potential lack of confidence in the organic and collective 621 
management of olive orchards. In this context, according the current Regulation on Rural 622 
Development, the association could benefit from the measure termed Advisory services, farm 623 
management and farm relief services. This measure seeks the improvement of the sustainable 624 
management and overall performance of the farms. Support can be claimed by individual farmers, 625 
groups and small and medium-sized enterprises, as long as it is focused on attaining clearly 626 
determined objectives, which include: climate change mitigation and adaptation, improvements of 627 
biodiversity, the protection of water, the development of short supply chains or organic farming. These 628 
objectives are clearly in line with those of the proposed TMC in SMOPS. Therefore, this measure 629 
seems quite appropriate to prevent that the costs associated with advisory services act as a barrier 630 
(European Network for Rural Development, 2011) for joining collective management approaches. 631 
TMC promote the collective management of the harvest, transport and commercialization of 632 
the product. Harvests can be carried out by hiring a squad of professional workers. The subsidies 633 
included in the RDPr paid for cooperation can be used to buy machinery to be used by farmers 634 
enrolled in TMC. This may enhance the efficiency of the collectively managed farming operation. 635 
New financial instruments such as credits with low interest rates are also considered in the new 636 
European Strategic Framework; these credits could also be used for acquiring the necessary 637 
machinery, or to support the infrastructure required to improve the marketing of the oil as a high 638 
quality product. 639 
The Thematic Working Group of the European Network for Rural Development (2011) 640 
analysed collective approaches to agri-environmental contracts. It identified that the existence of a 641 
legal entity, the existence of a clear action plan, the involvement of local authorities, the clear 642 
definition of control functions or the existence of an adequate advisory service are pre-conditions for 643 
the successful realisation of collective contracts. The relevance of all of these aspects is confirmed by 644 
this study. However, it should be underscored that our empirical findings have to be interpreted within 645 
their specific context before being generalised. In particular, we did not consider the application of 646 
TMC in alternative farming systems, for example in integrated production systems. Our results 647 
therefore apply only to SMOPS areas where organic farming is proved to be more beneficial relative 648 
to other systems, and the transfer of results to such systems should be made with caution.  649 
Future research is needed to identify the most efficient way in cost-benefit terms to 650 
implement the instrument. Building upon the results of this study, and focusing on a pilot case, future 651 
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research should investigate the impacts of different ways of implementing TMC, and aim at 652 
determining the characteristics of the area of implementation that play a key role in the functioning of 653 
TMC. The effect of, for example, the allocation of association memberships (directly or via public 654 
auctions), the impact of different spatial structures of the land that belongs to an association, the 655 
importance of the area’s physical (soil, climate, etc.) and social (ageing population, level of 656 
abandonment, etc.) characteristics, the effects of penalties, the effects of an integral management of 657 
the plots, or the resulting economies of scale could be subject of further analysis. The possibility of 658 
funding pilot studies under the Pillar II budget of the forthcoming CAP undoubtedly represents a good 659 
opportunity in this regard.  660 
5 Conclusions 661 
SMOPS are under a high risk of abandonment, which threatens the supply of a variety of ecosystem 662 
and social services highly valued by society. It is therefore important to develop alternative strategies 663 
aimed at preventing abandonment and its associated consequences. The conservation and enhancement 664 
of the sustainability of farming operations in less productive or disadvantaged areas, where many 665 
SMOPS are located, is also a priority in the forthcoming RDPr. In this study we analyse these two 666 
interlinked issues and propose the use of TMC associated with organic farming as an alternative 667 
management system to transform SMOPS into a more profitable and sustainable production system, 668 
with the goal of reducing land abandonment. The information generated can be used to design specific 669 
measures under the forthcoming regional RDPr to promote the cooperation between farmers to 670 
increase the profitability of their farms. 671 
According to the opinions of a sample of 187 farmers based in a characteristic Andalusian 672 
SMOPS area, almost the entire sample considers the instrument of TMC associated with organic 673 
farming a useful tool to increase the sustainability of SMOPS and would be willing to take part in an 674 
organic producers’ association aimed at implementing TMC in their area. However, 77 % of the 675 
farmers made the participation conditional on the commitments required by the association.  676 
The agreement reached at European level for the CAP 2013-2020 has retained the 677 
importance of collective contracts and the collaboration between farmers; indeed, cooperation and the 678 
creation of producers’ associations are considered cross-cutting aspects in the design of future RDPr, 679 
and joint contracts are considered one of the main elements of future “agri-environment - climate 680 
payments”. In the design of future agri-environmental policy instruments, specific attention should be 681 
given to flexibility of the agreements, the reduction of administrative burden and access to advisory 682 
services.  683 
Considering both the results of the paper and the current political framework, TMC may be 684 
introduced under the Rural Development Policy and, particularly, through the agri-environmental 685 
schemes. The characteristics that are likely to influence the successful implementation of TMC include 686 
21 
the existence of a legal entity (producers’ association), the existence of a clear action plan, the 687 
involvement of local authorities, the clear definition of control functions and the existence of an 688 
adequate advisory service. A territorial approach is indispensable, and should be introduced through 689 
the action plan, which has to be designed based on the locally specific characteristics of the territory 690 
and the farmers. 691 
Future research is needed to identify of the most efficient way to implement the proposed 692 
instruments. In this context, the use of procurement auctions in a pilot study setting to establish the 693 
most efficient way to create the spatial agglomeration of farmers should be considered.  694 
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